Time: Fri 29 May 2026, at 19:00

Place: Room 210, New Sun Student Center, Peking University

Speaker: HE Lei, Tongji University

Language: Chinese

This event is third lecture of the Fenghua 2026 Spring Series.

Abstract:

“Kant’s Philosophy of Action” may refer either to a theoretical construction that draws on Kantian philosophical resources while taking contemporary philosophy of action as its paradigm and point of concern, or to a systematic reflection on the problem of action aimed at elucidating the insights of Kant’s philosophy itself. As a pioneer of the latter approach, Friedrich Kaulbach’s interpretation (1978) sought to understand Kant’s philosophy in its unity as a theory of action. Although this interpretation was not entirely successful, the perspectivism (Perspektivismus) it brought to light is of great significance for understanding the unity of Kant’s philosophy.

This presentation will attempt to show that, even without grounding itself in a single univocal concept of action as a first principle, Kant’s philosophy can still provide clues for understanding the perspectival character of action itself. Furthermore, a perspectivist philosophy of action that is neither conventionally causal nor teleological may be constructed on the basis of an interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy as a whole, especially of transcendental idealism. Such an interpretation requires not only taking seriously the systematic reflections on reflective judgment and teleology in the third Critique, but also, on this basis, understanding and defending a certain moral rigorism (Rigorismus) in Kant.

       “康德的行动哲学”既可以是以当代行动哲学的范式和关切为前提的、借用康德哲学资源的理论构建，也可以是旨在阐明康德哲学本身之洞见的、对行动问题的系统思考。作为后一类型研究的先驱，考尔巴赫（Friedrich Kaulbach）的阐释（1978）意在将康德哲学整体理解为一个行动理论。这一不完全成功的阐释所揭示的康德的视角主义（Perspektivismus）对于理解康德哲学的整体性十分重要。本报告将尝试表明：尽管不以一个单义的行动概念为基础原则，康德哲学依然能提供理解行动现象本身之视角性的线索；进一步，一种既非典型的因果论、亦非目的论的视角主义行动哲学，有可能建立在对康德批判哲学的整体（尤其是对先验唯心论）的阐释之上。这一阐释不仅需要重视第三批判关于反思判断力和目的论问题的系统思考，还需在此基础上理解和辩护康德的某种道德严格主义（Rigorismus）。