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Section of Foreign Philosophy

  • Bin ZHAO
  • Assistant Professor
  • Homepage:https://sites.uci.edu/binzhao/
  • Education: Ph.D., University of California, Irvine, 2023
  • Areas of Research:Epistemology, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind


Bin Zhao is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Peking University. He received his Ph.D. from the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine.


His research interests lie primarily in epistemology, especially issues on the analysis of knowledge, modal epistemology, virtue epistemology, epistemic luck, epistemic closure, and the structure of epistemic justification, but he also has wide-ranging interests in the philosophy of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.



Zhao, Bin. (forthcoming). “On Mentioning Belief-Formation Methods in the Sensitivity Subjunctives.” Ergo.


Zhao, Bin. (forthcoming). “On Relativizing the Sensitivity Condition to Belief-Formation Methods.” American Philosophical Quarterly.


Zhao, Bin. (forthcoming). “On Translating the Sensitivity Condition to the Possible Worlds Idiom in Different Ways.” American Philosophical Quarterly.


Becker, Kelly, & Zhao, Bin. (2023). “Modal Epistemology.” In Duncan Pritchard (ed.), Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.


Zhao, Bin. (2023). “Induction, Conjunction Introduction, and Safety.” Philosophy, 98 (4): 477–483.


Zhao, Bin. (2022). “A Dilemma for Globalized Safety.” Acta Analytica, 37: 249–261.


Zhao, Bin. (2022). “Epistemic Closure, Necessary Truths, and Safety.” American Philosophical Quarterly, 59 (4): 391–401.


Zhao, Bin. (2022). “Knowledge from Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety.” Philosophia, 50: 833–845.


Zhao, Bin. (2022). “Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 30 (1): 56–71.


Zhao, Bin. (2021). “Can Infinitists Handle the Finite Mind Objection and the Distinction Objection?” Philosophia, 49: 2275–2291.